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Abstract
Recently, a special type of data poisoning (DP) attack, known as a backdoor, was proposed. These attacks aim
to have a classifier learn to classify to a target class whenever the backdoor pattern is present in a test sample. In this
paper, we address post-training detection of perceptible backdoor patterns in DNN image classifiers, wherein the
defender does not have access to the poisoned training set, but only to the trained classifier itself, as well as to clean
(unpoisoned) examples from the classification domain. This problem is challenging since a perceptible backdoor
pattern could be any seemingly innocuous object in a scene, and, without the poisoned training set, we have no
hint about the actual backdoor pattern used during training. We identify two important properties of perceptible
backdoor patterns, based upon which we propose a novel detector using the maximum achievable misclassification
fraction (MAMF) statistic. We detect whether the trained DNN has been backdoor-attacked and infer the source
and target classes used for devising the attack. Our detector, with an easily chosen threshold, is evaluated on five
datasets, five DNN structures and nine backdoor patterns, and shows strong detection capability. Coupled with an
imperceptible backdoor detector, our approach helps achieve detection for all evasive backdoors of interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural network (DNN) classifiers have achieved state-of-the-art pattern recognition performance
in many research areas such as speech recognition [6], bioinformatics [22], and computer vision [12][13].
However, they have also been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks [23]. This has inspired
adversarial learning research, wrestling between attackers and defenders. Test-time evasion (TTE) is
a prominent type of adversarial attack aiming to induce misclassifications during operation/test-time
by modifying test samples in a human-imperceptible (or machine-evasive) fashion, e.g. [5][18][16][2].
Another type of attack, data poisoning (DP), inserts malicious samples into the training set, often to
degrade the classifier’s accuracy [11][27].
Recently, a new form of backdoor DP attack, usually against DNN image classifiers, was proposed,
aiming to “sneak” a backdoor into the DNN, while not degrading the performance in accurately classifying
clean test samples [4][15][7]. A backdoor can be easily achieved by inserting a relatively small number
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2of poisoned images into the training set1. Backdoor training images are crafted by embedding the same
backdoor pattern (a.k.a. a backdoor trigger [7]) into legitimate (clean) images from one or more source
classes, and (mis)labeling to a target class (selected by the attacker). The backdoor pattern, principally
designed to be evasive to possible occasional human inspection of the training set, could be: 1) a human-
imperceptible, additive perturbation to clean images (dubbed an imperceptible backdoor pattern) [24] [26];
2) a seemingly innocuous object in a scene (dubbed a perceptible backdoor pattern), e.g. a bird flying
in the sky [4][7][8]. The DNN trained on the poisoned training set will still correctly classify clean
test images (because the number of poisoned samples is relatively small); hence validation set accuracy
degradation cannot be reliably used as a basis for detecting backdoors. However, when faced with a test
image containing the same backdoor pattern used in training, the DNN is likely to misclassify to the
target class prescribed by the attacker.
Defenses against backdoor attacks can be deployed either before/during training or post training. In the
before/during-training scenario, the defender has access to the (possibly poisoned) training set and the
trained classifier [24][3]. The defender’s goals are detecting whether the training set has been poisoned
and identifying and removing the embedded backdoor training images before (re)training. In the post-
training scenario, however, the defender has access to the trained DNN but not to the training set used for
its learning [14][25][8][26]. The post-training scenario is of strong interest because there are many pure
consumers of machine learning systems, e.g. an app used on millions of cell phones. The app user will
not have access to the training set on which the app’s classifier was learned. Still, the user would like to
know whether the app’s classifier has been backdoor-poisoned. Moreover, the user is assumed to possess a
clean labeled dataset with examples from each of the classes in the domain on which, e.g., it can evaluate
the performance of the DNN. The clean dataset is also assumed to be relatively small; hence it is not
sufficient for training a surrogate DNN (i.e. one without a backdoor present). The defender’s fundamental
goal in the post-training scenario is to detect whether the DNN has been backdoor-poisoned or not. If a
detection is made, the source class(es) and the target class should also be inferred, so that decisions made
to classes not involved in the attack could still possibly be trusted when there are no replacement DNNs
available.
In this paper, we focus on post-training detection of backdoor attacks with perceptible backdoor patterns,
which is a very challenging problem with no well-founded method proposed yet. Elsewhere, post-training
detection of imperceptible backdoors is addressed [26]. Together, our work and the imperceptible case
“cover” all cases of interests, providing a complete solution to post-training detection of evasive backdoors.
Our main contributions are as follows:
1) We propose a novel approach for detecting backdoor attacks with perceptible backdoor patterns, post-
training. Our detection is based on the maximum achievable misclassification fraction (MAMF) statistic,
obtained by reverse-engineering the backdoor pattern for each (source, target) class pair. Our detection
inference uses an easily chosen threshold. No unrealistic assumptions on the shape, spatial location or
object type of the backdoor pattern are made.
1The attackers poisoning capability is facilitated by the need in practice to obtain “big data” suitable for accurately training a DNN for a
given domain – to do so, one may need to seek data from as many sources as possible (some of which could be attackers).
32) We experimentally analyze two important properties of perceptible backdoor patterns that are ap-
plicable to general attack instances. These properties, which have neither been identified nor exploited in
prior works, are the basis of our detector and may potentially inspire other defenses.
3) We perform substantial evaluation and show the strong capability of our detector. Our experiments
involve five datasets of practical interest, five commonly used DNN structures, and nine backdoor patterns
of different types.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the threat model, including
the assumptions about the attacker. In Section III, we introduce some related works and point out their
relation to the current work. In Section IV, we discuss two properties of perceptible backdoor patterns,
based on which, we develop our detection procedure. In Section V, we report our experiments.
II. THREAT MODEL
We consider a backdoor DP attacker who intends to induce the classifier to learn to misclassify images
that ground-truth come from a source class s to a target class t whenever a test image originally from class
s contains the attacker’s chosen backdoor pattern. The attacker also aims to not degrade the classification
accuracy on clean test images. These goals are achieved by poisoning the classifier’s training set with a
few (e.g. tens to hundreds [4] of) backdoor images, crafted as
x˜ = g(x,v,m) = x (1−m) + v m, (1)
where x denotes clean images from class s and m is a 2-dimensional mask having the same spatial support
as x, with mij ∈ {0, 1} for any pixel (i, j). Often, the spatial region of 1’s for a mask is contiguous (Figure
1). For grayscale images,  denotes element-wise multiplication. For colored images, the 2-dimensional
mask m (or the “inverse mask” (1 −m)) is applied to all channels of the images. v is the perceptible
backdoor pattern chosen by the attacker.
In principle, the devised attack should be evasive, such that the backdoor pattern is not noticeable to
humans. Compared with imperceptible backdoor patterns whose evasiveness is achieved by setting the
perturbation norm to be extremely small [26], perceptible backdoor patterns considered in this work are
assumed to be objects seemingly innocuous within the context of the image. For example, in Figure 1, a
backdoor image used for attacking a pet breed classifier is created by adding a tennis ball to an image
from class “chihuahua”, following Eq. (1), and labeling to class “Abyssinian”.
In this paper, we do not make any unrealistic assumptions about the shape, spatial location, or object type
of the backdoor pattern to be used (unlike [8]). We only assume that the backdoor pattern is not spatially
fixed in the poisoned images – the attacker would like the classifier to learn a spatially-invariant backdoor
mapping, because where the pattern will be most innocuous may vary from test image to test image. That
is, an image-specific mask m is carefully designed by the attacker to “carve” the same backdoor pattern
into the best (suitably innocuous) location for each originally clean image. This assumption is reasonable
in practice. For example, if the backdoor pattern is a pair of glasses on the face of an individual [4], its
spatial location is then dependent on the location of the individual in the image2. Moreover, fixing the
spatial location of the backdoor pattern while creating backdoor training images will harm the robustness
2A more practical backdoor pattern may also be adjustable in its orientation, brightness and shadow, based on the scene it is carved into.
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Fig. 1: An example backdoor image used for attacking a pet breed classifier. A clean training image
from class “chihuahua” is added with a tennis ball, and labeled to class “Abyssinian”.
of the attack significantly during testing. As will be seen in the Appendix, for a backdoor pattern fixed to
the bottom left of the backdoor training images, even a single column/row shift of the backdoor pattern
at test time will severely degrade the attack effectiveness. Also, it is meaningless to fix the location of
the backdoor pattern given that training data augmentation might be used.
III. RELATED WORKS
The first attempt towards post-training defense against backdoor attacks, to the best of our knowledge,
is the fine-pruning (FP) approach proposed in [14]. FP, which removes neurons from the DNN, assumes
that there is a simple “dichotomization” of neurons, with most solely dedicated to “normal” operation and
some solely dedicated to implementing the backdoor, which is unfortunately not valid in many practical
cases. Moreover, FP does not actually detect the presence of backdoor attacks and it removes neurons
even from non-attacked DNNs.
An anomaly detection (AD) approach was proposed in [26] which considers post-training detection of
imperceptible backdoors. For each (source, target) class pair, an optimized perturbation that induces high
group misclassification fraction when added to clean source class images is obtained. If the DNN has
been attacked, the optimized perturbation associated with the class pair involved in the attack will have
abnormally low L2 norm, and a detection can be made on this basis. However, this approach cannot be
borrowed for detecting perceptible backdoors. First, reverse engineering a perceptible backdoor pattern
(which could be any object) requires also reverse engineering the associated mask. This is more challenging
compared with searching for a small additive perturbation starting from a zero (image-wide) initialized
additive perturbation. Poor initialization while optimizing the backdoor pattern and the mask could lead
5to an estimated pattern irrelevant to what was used for devising the attack and one requiring improbably
large spatial support to achieve high group misclassification. Second, even if the backdoor pattern used
for devising the attack could be luckily reversely engineered for the true backdoor class pair (s, t), it
could be hard to find a metric to distinguish this from estimated patterns for non-backdoor class pairs
(s′, t′) 6= (s, t), because in the perceptible case the assumption in [26] that the backdoor pattern is small
in size/norm does not hold.
Closest to our work, neural cleanse (NC) proposed in [25] aims to detect perceptible backdoors post-
training. NC obtains, for each putative target class, a pattern and an associated mask by optimizing an
objective function that induces a high misclassification fraction when added to images from all classes
other than the target class. If there is an attack, the L1 norm of the obtained mask for the true backdoor
target class will be abnormally small and a detection is made. However, NC does not really solve our
problem due to two critical limitations. First, all classes except for the target class are unreasonably
assumed to be involved in the attack. In practice, this should be avoided; otherwise, too many backdoor
training images need to be created, making the attack less evasive. Particularly, many classes may not
be able to be involved in an innocuous attack due to the choice of the perceptible backdoor pattern. For
example, if the backdoor pattern is a bird in the sky, only classes that possibly contain the sky can be
used for devising the attack. Second, NC penalizes the L1 norm of the mask while maximizing the group
misclassification fraction to estimate the pattern and the mask, but the detection is sensitive to the choice
of the penalizing multiplier. For CIFAR-10, unless the multiplier is carefully chosen, the results could be
either a mask with low L1 norm but not achieving the target misclassification fraction, or a wild-looking
backdoor pattern with improbably large and distributed spatial support, which has no relation to the ground
truth backdoor pattern (for the true target class when there is in fact an attack).
IV. POST-TRAINING DETECTION OF PERCEPTIBLE BACKDOORS
Our detector, like most related works on post-training defenses, assumes that there is a relatively small
clean dataset containing images from all classes [14][26][25][8]. The defender does not have access to
the training set used for the DNN’s learning, and cannot train a new classifier (it may lack both sufficient
training and computational resources). The objectives of the defender are detecting whether the classifier
has been attacked or not and inferring the source class(es) and the target class if there is an attack.
A. Basis of Our Detection
Our detection is based on two properties of perceptible backdoor patterns that hold for general attack
instances.
Property 1: Spatial invariance of backdoor mapping: If a perceptible backdoor pattern is spatially
distributed over backdoor training images (placed so as to be most innocuous in each image), the learned
backdoor mapping will be spatially invariant in inducing targeted misclassifications on test images.
In Section II, we reasonably assumed that the perceptible backdoor pattern could be spatially located
anywhere in a backdoor training image so as to be scene-plausible. The trained DNN will then learn the
backdoor pattern, but not its spatial location. This property is actually favored by the attacker, since there
will be more freedom to embed the backdoor pattern in clean test images. As will be seen in Section
6TABLE I: Details of the attack instances.
Attack A Attack B Attack C Attack D Attack E Attack F Attack G Attack H Attack I
Dataset CIFAR-10 CIFAR-10 CIFAR-10 CIFAR-10 CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 Oxford-IIIT SVHN PubFig
Image size 32× 32 32× 32 32× 32 32× 32 32× 32 32× 32 128× 128 32× 32 256× 256
No. classes 10 10 10 10 10 100 6 10 33
Training size 50000 50000 50000 50000 50000 50000 900 73257 2782
Test size 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 300 26032 495
DNN
structure
ResNet-18 ResNet-18 ResNet-18 ResNet-18 VGG-16 ResNet-34 AlexNet ConvNet VGG-16
Learning rate 10−3 10−3 10−3 10−3 10−3 10−4 10−5 10−3 10−4
Batch size 32 32 32 32 32 32 16 32 32
No. training
epochs
200 200 200 200 200 200 120 80 120
Benchmark
acc. (%)
86.7 88.1 86.7 87.6 87.9 71.9 88.7 89.2 76.0
Source class “cat” “deer” “airplane” “frog” “truck” “road” “chihuahua” “3” “B. Obama”
Target class “dog” “horse” “bird” “bird” “automobile” “bed” “Abyssinian” “8” “C. Ronaldo”
Backdoor Pattern “bug” “butterfly” “rainbow” “bug&butterfly” “gas tank” “marmot” “tennis ball” “bullet holes” “sunglasses”
No. backdoor
training images
150 150 150 150 150 100 50 500 40
Attack test
acc. (%)
87.0 86.9 86.8 87.0 89.1 71.7 90.0 90.1 77.0
Attack succ.
rate (%)
99.3 98.0 96.4 98.0 97.9 92.0 84.0 91.4 93.3
V-A, at test time, backdoor images with the backdoor pattern randomly located are still likely to yield
misclassifications to the target class prescribed by the attacker.
Property 2: Robustness of perceptible backdoor patterns: It is unnecessary to use exactly the same
perceptible backdoor pattern at test time to induce targeted misclassifications.
As will be seen in Section V-C, even when strong noise is added to the backdoor pattern while
creating backdoor test images, they will still likely be (mis)classified to the designated target class. More
importantly, if only part (in terms of spatial support) of the backdoor pattern is added to the clean source
class images during testing, this also induces (mis)classification to the target class. This is not surprising
because perceptible backdoor patterns, like all other patterns, are learned by the DNN by extracting key
features, which usually occupy a much smaller spatial support than the full backdoor pattern itself.
B. Detection Approach
Key ideas: 1) For class pairs used for devising backdoor attacks, finding a pattern that induces a
high misclassification fraction on the clean dataset is achievable on a relatively small spatial support
arbitrarily located in the image. 2) For non-backdoor class pairs, much larger spatial support is required
to find a pattern that induces a high misclassification fraction.
The key ideas of our detection are well supported by the properties in Section IV-A. Based on Property
1, since the learned backdoor mapping is spatially invariant, it should be possible to reverse engineer
(estimate) a backdoor pattern (inducing high group misclassification) for the backdoor class pair by
choosing the center of the estimated pattern’s spatial support to be anywhere in the image (except at
the image border, where the pattern’s full spatial support is not contained). Thus, it does not matter where
7we place the estimated pattern’s spatial support – in our experiments we fixed a location for all clean
images used by the detector, but it is even possible that one could vary the center position for each clean
image – accurate backdoor pattern estimation and detection should still be possible. According to Property
2, a pattern that effectively induces group misclassification for the backdoor class pair could be spatially
smaller than the true backdoor pattern, as long as sufficient “representative” features of the backdoor can
be captured by this restricted spatial support – for the same (relatively small) spatial support, finding a
pattern that induces a high misclassification fraction for the backdoor class pair is much more achievable
than for non-backdoor pairs. This will be born out experimentally in the sequel.
Our two-step detection procedure is as follows:
1) Pattern Estimation: Given a K-class DNN classifier to be inspected, for each of the K(K − 1)
(source, target) class pairs, we perform pattern estimations separately on each of L square-shaped3 spatial
supports (increasing in size). Each square spatial support, with a location arbitrarily chosen4 and fixed
for all clean images used for detection, has a specific (absolute) width denoted by w ∈ Z+, such that
w ∈ [drmin×W e, brmax×W c]. Here, W is the width of the input image; rmin and rmax (both in [0, 1]) are
the minimum and maximum relative support widths for pattern estimation, respectively. For example, for
W = 32, with rmin = 0.15 and rmax = 0.2, L = 2 pattern estimations with w = 5 and w = 6 respectively
will be performed for each class pair.
For each class pair (s, t) and support width w, we estimate a pattern v∗stw so as to maximize the group
misclassification fraction from class s to class t by solving the following problem5:
maximize
vstw
∑
x∈Ds
pt(g(x,vstw,Mw)). (2)
Here, Ds is the set of clean images from source class s that are correctly classified, possessed by the
defender, pt(·) is the DNN’s posterior for class t, Mw ∈ {0, 1}W×W is the mask with the fixed w × w
square spatial support specified by locations with 1’s. Clearly, our pattern estimation problem, which could
be solved using e.g. SGD, is more tractable than NC, which jointly estimates a pattern and a mask. Finally,
our detection statistic, the maximum achievable misclassification fraction (MAMF) associated with each
class pair (s, t) and spatial support width w, denoted by ρstw ∈ [0, 1], is computed as the fraction of all
x˜ = g(x,v∗stw,Mw), where x ∈ Ds, that are (mis)classified to class t.
2) Detection Inference: For each class pair (s, t), we compute the average MAMF ρ¯st over the L MAMF
statistics, each corresponding to one of the L spatial supports used for pattern estimation. For a relatively
small rmax (and the L associated small spatial supports), if there was an attack, we would expect a class
pair (which is the true backdoor pair) with large average MAMF; otherwise, the maximum ρ¯st for all
(s, t) pairs is expected to be small. Hence there should be a range of thresholds pi ∈ (0, 1] (with very
high true detection rate and low false positive rate as confirmed in Section V-B), such that if
ρ∗ = max
(s,t)
ρ¯st > pi, (3)
3Other shapes, e.g. rectangular or circle, can also be used.
4Because of Property 1, it does not matter where we locate a square support. It will not impact pattern estimation and detection performance.
5Other objective functions consistent with inducing misclassifications could also be used
8the DNN is inferred to be attacked; otherwise, no backdoor is detected. We will further discuss the choices
of rmin and rmax in Section V-B. Moreover, if an attack is detected, (s∗, t∗) = arg max(s,t) ρ¯st is inferred
as a (source, target) class pair involved in devising the attack.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Devising Backdoor Attacks
We demonstrate the validity of the properties in Section IV-A and the performance of our detector
using nine attack instances, involving five datasets, five DNN structures, and nine backdoor patterns. The
datasets and the DNN structures considered here are commonly used in computer vision research. Other
popular datasets, e.g. Caltech101, ImageNet, etc., are not used in our experiments since the overall test
accuracy or the accuracy of particular classes are fairly low, preventing them from being used in practice.
For each attack instance, we first train a benchmark DNN using an unpoisoned training set and report
the accuracy on clean test images as the “benchmark accuracy”. The dataset being used, image size,
number of classes, training size and test size are shown in Table I. In particular, for Attack G, the test
accuracy using the entire dataset, in absence of backdoor attacks, is very low [19]. We achieve a reasonable
benchmark test accuracy on G by using a subset of data involving only 6 classes. For Attack I, many
images are not able to be downloaded; hence we only consider 33 (out of 60) classes with more than
60 images. The DNN structures involved in our experiments include ResNet-18, ResNet-34 [10], VGG-
16 [21], AlexNet [12] and ConvNet [20]. The choices of DNN structure, learning rate, batch size and
number of training epochs for each attack instance are also shown in Table I. The Adam optimizer is
used for all DNN training in this paper. For the benchmark training of Attack F, G and I, we also use
training data augmentation including random cropping, random horizontal flipping and random rotation.
For the benchmark training of Attack G, we fine-tune a pretrained AlexNet provided by Pytorch. For the
benchmark training of Attack I, we adopt transfer learning by retraining the last four layers of a pretrained
VGG-face model [1].
For each attack, we train the DNN using the same training settings on the same training set (as for
the benchmark), except that the training set is poisoned by a number of backdoor images. The backdoor
images are created using clean images from a source class, with a backdoor pattern added following Eq.
(1), and labeling to a target class. The choices of the backdoor pattern, the number of backdoor training
images, the source class and the target class for each attack instance are shown in Table I.
To create scene-plausible backdoor attacks, we first created a large number of candidate backdoor
images, each with the backdoor pattern randomly located in the image. Then we manually picked the
images in which the backdoor pattern looks scene-plausible6. For example, for Attack C where the source
class is “airplane”and the backdoor pattern is a “rainbow”, a valid backdoor training image being selected
should have the rainbow in the sky (see Figure 2c). Since the focus of this paper is the defense, we did
not polish the backdoor patterns to make them completely innocuous to humans. In Figure 2, we show
an example backdoor training image and its original clean image for each attack instance. The backdoor
patterns being considered here are representatives of multiple types of practical backdoor patterns. The
6Only for Attack I we carefully place the sunglasses on the face.
9“bug” for Attack A and the “butterfly” for attack B represent backdoor patterns in the periphery (not
covering the foreground object of interest) of an image and with a modest size. The “rainbow” for Attack
C represents large backdoor patterns with an irregular shape. The backdoor patterns for Attack D and H
represent dispersed patterns. The “sunglasses” for Attack I represent backdoor patterns overlapping with
features of interest.
In Table I, we also report the accuracy on clean test images and attack success rate of all attack instances.
The attack success rate is defined as the fraction of backdoor test images being classified to the target
class prescribed by the attacker. A backdoor test image is created using a clean test image from the source
class, adding the same backdoor pattern used for creating the backdoor training images, and labeled to the
target class. We took an automated approach (due to the huge number of test images) to create backdoor
test images, randomly placing the backdoor pattern in the image (except for the sunglasses for Attack I).
By doing so for a sufficiently large test set, we should be covering all possible spatial locations where the
attacker could place the backdoor pattern when creating backdoor test images in practice. As shown in
the table, for all attack instances, the attack success rate is high, and there is no significant degradation in
clean test accuracy compared with the benchmark accuracy; hence all attacks are successful. Moreover,
we emphasize that such success is achieved with randomly placed backdoor patterns in test images, which
experimentally verifies Property 1, i.e. the spatial invariance of the learned perceptible backdoor mapping.
B. Detection Performance Evaluation
For each of the attack instances, our detection is applied to both the DNN being attacked and the clean
benchmark DNN. For the best discrimination between the two categories of DNNs, relatively small spatial
supports should be used for pattern estimation, such that a DNN being attacked could have a much larger
ρ∗ than a clean DNN. On the one hand, the spatial support should be smaller than that of the foreground
objects associated with the actual classes; otherwise, the target class object(s) could possibly be reverse
engineered, causing high group misclassification even for a clean DNN. Moreover, if rmax has to be large,
the backdoor is likely not innocuous, i.e. not scene-plausible. Here, rmax = 0.22 for all attack instances
for our experiments. In practice, an rmax could be adaptively chosen for each data set as the critical spatial
support allowing a proportion of class pairs (e.g. 50%) to achieve a modest MAMF (e.g. 0.4) during the
pattern estimation step. On the other hand, the spatial support should be large enough for estimating any
pattern related to the backdoor. Here, rmin = 0.08, such that for a 32× 32 image, there is at least 3× 3
spatial support for pattern estimation.
The details of our detection settings are as follows. For Attack A–E and Attack H, 200 images that
are correctly classified per class are used for detection. For Attack F, G and I, 50, 30 and 9 correctly
classified clean images per class are used for detection, respectively. For all DNNs, class pairs and spatial
supports, we solve (2) using Adam optimizer and learning rate 0.5 for 100 epochs7. We use mini-batch
size 32 for Attack A–E and H, 10 for Attack F and G and 3 for Attack I. The spatial support for pattern
estimation is a square covering the top left corner of each image used for detection. Due to Property 1
that has been verified in Section V-A, other locations should yield similar results, as illustrated in the
Appendix.
7Fewer epochs are actually needed for decent convergence in all our experiments.
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TABLE II: Attack success rate (%) of backdoor test images with (Gaussian) noisy backdoor patterns with
σ2 = 0.01, 0.25, 1 and cropped backdoor patterns to 64% and 36% of the original size.
σ2 Crop
0.01 0.25 1 64% 36%
Attack A 85.2 53.6 53.7 84.6 73.2
Attack B 97.8 86.7 87.6 67.8 26.3
Attack C 62.4 46.9 23.6 96.0 29.1
Attack D 98.1 99.9 99.0 81.7 60.2
Attack E 78.4 45.6 32.0 91.4 46.0
Attack F 97.0 91.0 83.0 86.0 69.0
Attack G 78.0 38.0 28.0 78.0 62.0
Attack H 91.3 66.7 67.2 41.7 20.7
Attack I 86.7 86.7 80.0 40.0 26.7
In Figure 3, for both DNNs in each attack instance, we show the (L) MAMF statistics for the class
pair with the largest average MAMF (i.e. the class pair corresponding to ρ∗). For example, for Attack A
where the data image size is 32× 32, the (absolute) support widths being considered are w = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
For large data image size, instead of performing pattern estimation for each integer support widths in the
interval [drmin ×W e, brmax ×W c], we could efficiently downsample and perform pattern estimation for
fewer support widths. Here, L = 9 and L = 7 support widths are considered for Attack G (see Figure
3g) and Attack I (see Figure 3i) respectively. In each figure of Figure 3, a large gap is observed, clearly
discriminating the DNN being attacked from the clean DNN.
In Figure 4, we show the largest average MAMF (i.e. ρ∗) for both DNNs for all attack instances. Note
the clear large difference between the two bars for each attack instance. Thus any detection threshold
pi in (0.6, 0.8), if used, could successfully detect whether the DNN is attacked. Moreover, for the DNN
being attacked, for all attack instances, the class pair corresponding to the maximum average MAMF is
precisely the true backdoor pair. Hence when a detection is made, the (source, target) class pair (used by
the attacker) is also correctly inferred.
Again, we address that our assumptions about the attack are more realistic for perceptible backdoors
than the assumptions in NC that all classes other than the target class are involved in devising the attack.
For the attack instances in our experiments (that use a single source class), NC is not expected to make
a correct detection. We evaluate its performance in the Appendix as verification.
C. Verification of Property 2
Here we verify Property 2, the robustness property of perceptible backdoor patterns from two aspects.
First, for each attack instance, we modify the backdoor pattern embedded into each clean test image (from
the source class) by adding Gaussian noise N(0, σ2) to each pixel (and then clipping each pixel value to
[0, 1]). Second, instead of adding noise, we crop part of the backdoor pattern outside its center before
embedding to the clean test images. We evaluate the attack success rate for noisy backdoor patterns with
σ2 = 0.1, 0.5, 1 and cropped backdoor patterns to 64% and 36% of the original size in Table II. For most
of the attack instances, using noisy or cropped backdoor patterns at test time still achieves high attack
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success rate (even though cropping from the center of a backdoor pattern may remove critical features on
the periphery of the backdoor pattern).
D. Number of Images for Detection
We note that if too few clean images are available to the defender, the performance of our detector
could be affected. When there are no attacks, a false detection may be made since it is much easier to
find a pattern that induces misclassification for a small group than for a larger one. This has been verified
in [17] which studies TTE attacks, as a “universal” perturbation inducing group misclassification needs
much larger norm (and full spatial support) than a perturbation inducing single-image misclassification at
test time. In Figure 5, we show the MAMF statistics for the class pair with the largest average MAMF
for both DNNs of Attack A, with 5, 10, 25, 50, 100 and 200 clean images per class used for pattern
estimation. When the number of clean images used for detection is greater than 10, there is a clear gap
between the two curves for the DNN being attacked and its clean counterpart. But if fewer images are
used for detection, the curve corresponding to the clean DNN approaches 1.0 more quickly, i.e. achieving
a high group misclassification fraction becomes easier and requires a smaller spatial support. This is the
same phenomenon as in Figure 3i for Attack I, where the curve for the clean DNN quickly achieves 1.0
as the support width for pattern estimation increases, since only 9 clean images are used for detection.
Note, though, that our detector is successful even in this case – there is still a large gap between the
curves.
In practice, for the purpose of evaluating the clean test accuracy of the DNN, the user should possess
sufficient clean images from all classes. If not, we suggest to use a smaller detection threshold for
compensation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a detector for perceptible backdoors, post-training. Our detection, inspired
by two properties of perceptible backdoor patterns, is based on the maximum achievable misclassification
fraction statistic. With an easily chosen threshold, our detector shows strong capability for a range of
datasets and backdoor patterns.
Yet there are potential improvements to our detector that could be studied in the future. First, even
for a DNN with relatively high test accuracy, there might be classes very similar to each other and with
high class confusion; hence there might be a pattern found on a small spatial support that induces high
group misclassification fraction for such a class pair. To avoid false detections, one may build knowledge
of confusion matrix information into the detector. Second, the pattern estimation step in our detector is
performed for all class pairs. When there are thousands of classes, a more efficient version of our detector
is of great interest.
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
A. Backdoor Patterns with Fixed Spatial Location
Here we use a simple experiment to show that the power of the attack will be degraded if the perceptible
backdoor pattern is spatially fixed when poisoning the clean training images. We use the same dataset,
training settings, (source, target) class pair and backdoor pattern under Attack B. The only difference is
that, the backdoor training images are created by embedding the backdoor pattern, the “butterfly”, into
the bottom left corner of each clean training image to be poisoned.
After training, the accuracy of the DNN on clean test images is 87.2%, which is similar to the accuracy
of the clean benchmark DNN. Now we create four groups of images, 1000 each, using the clean test
images from the source class prescribed by the attacker, such that:
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1) The backdoor pattern is embedded into the bottom left corner of all images.
2) The backdoor pattern is spatially randomly located in each image.
3) The backdoor pattern is embedded one row up from the bottom left corner of all images.
4) The backdoor pattern is embedded one column right of the bottom left corner of all images.
Here we only focus on the spatial location of the backdoor pattern without considering whether
the backdoor patterns are scene-plausible or not. The fraction (%) of images in each group that are
(mis)classified to the target class prescribed by the attack are 99.7, 4.1, 47.8, 14.4, respectively. Clearly,
only if the backdoor pattern during testing is located at the same place as during training, the backdoor
image will be reliably (mis)classified to the target class. Hence fixing the spatial location of the backdoor
pattern when creating backdoor training images largely degrades the power of the attack.
B. Location of the Spatial Support for Pattern Estimation
According to Property 1, the spatial invariance of the perceptible backdoor mapping, the location of
the spatial support in the pattern estimation step can be arbitrarily chosen. In the paper, we fixed the
spatial support location to cover the top left corner for all clean images used for detection. Here, we
experimentally verify that such choice is not critical to our detection.
We consider the same DNN being attacked and the same clean benchmark DNN under Attack B. We
apply the same detection to both DNNs except that the spatial support for detection is fixed to cover
1) the top right corner, 2) the bottom left corner, 3) the bottom right corner of all clean images used
for detection. In Figure 6, for each location of the spatial support, we show the L maximum achievable
misclassification fraction (MAMF) statistics for the class pair with the largest average MAMF, for both
DNNs. In each figure, we observe a large gap between the two curves, indicating that the DNN being
attacked could be easily detected for a large range of thresholds.
C. Performance Evaluation of NC
We evaluate NC for the attack instances A–I. As mentioned in the paper, NC jointly estimates a pattern
and an associated mask for each putative target class to induce at least φ-level misclassification [25]. The
optimization problem solved for pattern estimation relies on the choice of the penalty multiplier λ (for the
L1-regularization of the mask) and the training settings. We used the Adam optimizer with the parameters
suggested by the authors of NC and performed mini-batch optimization for a sufficient number of epochs
(until convergence). If λ is too large, φ-level group misclassification can be achieved at the beginning,
but the actual group misclassification fraction quickly reduces, since the mask “size” is over-penalized. If
λ is too small, high group misclassification fraction will be maintained, but the L1 norm of the mask is
unreasonably large. Hence we carefully adjust λ and the training parameters for each attack instance to
achieve a mask with small L1 norm and a pattern inducing a high group misclassification fraction. For
all the attack instances, we set φ = 0.9, and the optimization is performed for 200 epochs. The number
of clean images per class used for detection, the choice of λ, the learning rate and the batch size for each
attack instance are shown in Table III.
The detection inference of NC uses an “anomaly index” derived based on MAD [9] of the L1 norm
of the mask for all putative target classes [25]. If the anomaly index is larger than 2, a detection is made
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TABLE III: Detailed settings of NC, including the number of clean images per class used for detection,
the choice of λ, the learning rate and the batch size, for each attack instance.
Attack A Attack B Attack C Attack D Attack E Attack F Attack G Attack H Attack I
No. images per class 100 100 100 100 100 10 30 100 9
λ 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1
Learning rate 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.001 0.01 0.005
Batch size 90 90 90 90 90 90 60 100 30
with 95% confidence. In Figure 7, we show the anomaly indices for both the DNN being attacked and the
clean DNN for each attack instance. Only for Attack B and Attack G, NC successfully detects the attack
– for both of these two attacks, there is a pattern and an associated relatively small mask, when applied
to clean test images from all classes other than a target class, that induces a high group misclassification.
This phenomenon is identified in [26] as “collateral damage”; that is, when the attack involves a single
source class, it is possible to induce a misclassification to the target class when the backdoor pattern is
added to a class other than the source class or the target class – the classifier’s decision is made mainly
based on the presence of the backdoor pattern but not the actual object of interest of the class.
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(a) bug (b) butterfly
(c) rainbow (d) bug and butterfly
(e) gas tank (f) marmot
(g) tennis ball (h) bullet holes
(i) sunglasses
Fig. 2: Example backdoor image and the originally clean image for attack instances A–I. Subcaptions
describe the object(s) added as the perceptible backdoor pattern for each attack instance.
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(a) Attack A (b) Attack B
(c) Attack C (d) Attack D
(e) Attack E (f) Attack F
(g) Attack G (h) Attack H
(i) Attack I
Fig. 3: Maximum achievable misclassification fraction (MAMF) statistics for the class pair with the largest
average MAMF, for both attacked DNN and unattacked (clean DNN), for attack instances A–I. Relative
support range for pattern estimation is (0.08, 0.22).
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Fig. 4: Largest average maximum achievable misclassification fraction (MAMF), i.e. ρ∗, over all class
pairs for both the attacked DNN and unattacked (clean) DNN, for attack instances A–I.
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Fig. 5: Maximum achievable misclassification fraction (MAMF) ρ∗ for a range of choices of relative
support width r, for both DNNs being attacked and unattacked for Attack A, when using 5, 10, 25, 50,
100 and 200 clean images per class for detection, respectively.
(a) Top right corner (b) Bottom left corner (c) Bottom right corner
Fig. 6: Maximum achievable misclassification fraction (MAMF) statistics for the class pair with the largest
average MAMF, for both the DNN being attacked and the DNN not attacked under Attack B. The spatial
support for pattern estimation is fixed to cover a) the top left corner, b) the bottom left corner, and c) the
bottom right corner.
19
Fig. 7: Anomaly indices when applying NC to the DNN being attacked and the clean DNN of Attack
A–I.
